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Seventy or eighty years have passed since corporation law has had
anything much to say about the relationship between business corporations
and the rest of American society. By corporation law, I mean the body of
state statutory and common law rules that govern United States corpora-
tions. For much of this century, this body of law has focused almost
exclusively on the relationship between those who manage a firm-directors
and officers-and those who own it-the shareholders. Because shareholders
of a large corporation have no direct involvement in its control, shareholders
require assurance that management effectively is pursuing the shareholders'
financial interests. This accountability problem engenders a basic question
that lies at the heart of corporation law: How can shareholders prevent
management from hindering the shareholders' financial objective by, for
example, falling to conduct the business efficiently or perhaps even pursuing
conflicting goals at the shareholders' expense?
The doctrinal preoccupation with accountability takes for granted an
underlying principle, a principle that provides the fundamental postulate of
modern corporation law. A corporation exists for the financial benefit of
its shareholders; management must devote itself to this single purpose- with
relentless fidelity. In response to this basic norm, therefore, corporation
law offers a body of doctrine designed to address the accountability problem.
Rules specifying management's fiduciary duties of care and loyalty identify
more particularly the contours of the norm's prescriptions. In addition,
corporation law offers procedural mechanisms, in the form of the share-
holders' power annually to elect the board of directors and the shareholder's
derivative suit, for enforcement of the particular obligations imposed upon
management. Like any other body of legal doctrine, of course, corporation
law is very complex. But its basic thrust is quite simple.
In nineteenth-century America, however, corporation law had a far
broader focus than its present preoccupation with ensuring accountability
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and maximizing shareholder wealth indicates. Various legal doctrines re-
vealed serious concerns about the economic and political power of corpo-
rations. States sought to control the threat to society that such power
presented and used corporation law as a tool for that purpose. The difference
between nineteenth-century corporation law and recent corporation law,
therefore, is that between a societal or regulatory perspective and the present
internal or governance perspective.' It is also the difference between making
corporations responsive to various nonshareholder interests and requiring
corporations to dedicate themselves single-mindedly to shareholder welfare.
The explosion of hostile takeover activity in recent years has raised an
important policy controversy. Because takeovers include a bidder's offer of
a premium over market value to a target company's shareholders, takeovers
present an opportunity for shareholders to realize impressive financial gains.
In addition, because a successful hostile takeover typically results in the
members of the target company's management losing their positions, the
heightened threat of hostile takeovers may create powerful incentives for
corporate management diligently to pursue shareholder welfare so as to
minimize the likelihood of a successful hostile bid. Those that advocate a
robust "market for corporate control" thus base their claims primarily on
the enhancement of shareholder wealth. Additionally, some argue that
society as a whole will benefit from the reallocation of resources to higher
valued uses that takeovers are said to generate. According to this view,
shareholders' financial interests in the takeover context are congruent with
society's interest in efficiency.
State legislatures, however, have taken a different view of the takeover
phenomenon. They have intervened in order to impede or at least to regulate
the current wave of takeover activity. Although apparently dealt a crippling
blow by the United States Supreme Court in 1982,2 state legislatures have
rebounded and continue their efforts to exert some kind of control over
takeovers. One typical state takeover statute recently survived constitutional
attack in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,3 and several states
have adopted even more potent statutory approachs to the perceived prob-
lem. While state takeover legislation often pays lip service to shareholder
welfare, such legislation actually has a different purpose, a purpose fun-
damentally antithetical to the shareholder primacy norm of present corpo-
ration law. These statutes instead represent efforts to curb takeover activity
on the ground that takeovers are harmful to various nonshareholder con-
stituencies that feel their impact. Because the objective of hostile takeovers
in recent years typically has been to gain control and then to realize the
full value of the target company by dismantling or liquidating its assets,
4
1. One might also say that present law is merely "enabling" rather than "regulatory."
2. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
3. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
4. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REv. 1, 2-7 (1986).
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the impact on the communities in which these target companies do business
has been perceived to be extremely disruptive. Not only have management
and lower level employees lost their jobs, but ripple effects on the company's
established network of suppliers, creditors, and consumers, who are de-
pendent on the firm for their livelihood, have been tremendous. State and
local governments have lost tax revenues, and communities have lost char-
itable contributions. These perceived effects on local economies, rather than
concern for shareholders, have prompted state action.
State takeover legislation has taken the form of revisions or amendments
to state corporation statutes. These laws redefine or revise certain elements
of the corporate structure created by both the corporation statutes and state
common law. Generally, takeover statutes address various aspects of the
attributes of share ownership and of the board's fiduciary duty. While
focusing on such "internal" questions, however, the actual goal of state
takeover legislation is the achievement of broader societal objectives. These
laws attempt to regulate certain kinds of corporate activity for the benefit
of parties external to the corporation's management/shareholder relation-
ship. As a result, takeover laws reject the purely internal perspective of
present corporation law in favor of an approach that seeks to use corpo-
ration law to address important questions about the relationship between
corporations and society.
This embrace of objectives that parallel earlier, broader goals of cor-
poration law has implications that extend beyond the takeover problem. It
reaches deeper, to the question of corporation law's social and political
function. As states wrestle with the takeover phenomenon, they may be in
the process of revising basic ideas about the relationship between corpora-
tions and society and what role corporation law should play in structuring
that relationship. Their efforts recall an earlier vision that once dominated
thinking about these issues. It is this apparent congruence that may cause
us to ask whether we are witnessing a rebirth of corporation law.
I. CORPORATIONS AND SociETY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY A.M RICA
A. Regulation of Economic Power
Nineteenth-century corporation law addressed policy concerns that dif-
fered fundamentally from those of modern doctrine. State laws reflected
deep doubts about the potentially harmful effects of business corporations
on the general public. Two basic concerns underlay this preoccupation.
First, corporate status tended in the nineteenth century to be associated
with special privilege. Americans feared that incorporation to pursue a
particular line of business represented denial of opportunity to others who
might also have sought to enter that line. Thus, incorporation, in the view
of many, threatened to foreclose entrepreneurial activity. Actually, because
corporate charters rarely granted monopoly privileges, these fears were
1988]
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misplaced.5 Nevertheless, in the public's opinion, corporate status seemed
inevitably to threaten equality of opportunity.
6
Second, and of more importance to contemporaries, grants of corporate
status threatened the balance of economic power in American society.
7
Incorporation appeared to present opportunities for accumulation and en-
trenchment of wealth that otherwise would be unavailable. Economic power
of such magnitude was potentially harmful to consumers, workers, and
anyone else forced to deal with the corporation. Even more ominous,
economic power would bring with it political power. Because corporate
organization concentrated managerial power over potentially vast economic
resources in the hands of a few, the likelihood that the managers would
wield that power in a self-serving manner threatened the public's general
welfare. Again, although it was not necessarily true that corporate status
would confer economic power which otherwise would be unattainable, that
reality did not blunt criticism of the corporate device on balance of power
grounds.8
For much of the nineteenth century, each instance of incorporation
required a special act of the state legislature. These special charters were
tailor-made to the needs of the particular incorporators and included what-
ever regulations and restrictions the legislature deemed to be peculiarly
suited to the firm being incorporated. Special chartering raised concerns
about favoritism and political corruption. Critics argued repeatedly that
entrepreneurs bribed legislators to obtain the advantages of incorporation. 9
This reason alone led some to advocate the abolition of corporations, 0 but
other reforms were chosen instead.
Some states sought to ensure the equality of opportunity through
constitutional provisions requiring a two-thirds legislative majority in favor
of granting each corporate charter. " This requirement diminished promoters'
ability to use their influence in ways that threatened public welfare. The
more generally favored solution to the inequality of opportunity problem,
however, took a different form. Most state legislatures responded by en-
acting general incorporation laws, the ancestors of present corporation
statutes. By dispensing with the need for a special legislative act and instead
5. Courts construed corporate charters strictly, refusing to find rights to monopoly by
implication. See Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837).
6. See J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970 30-34 (1970).
7. For a discussion of the importance of the theory of balanced power in nineteenth-
century law and political economy, see Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power,
61 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1219 (1988).
8. See J. HURST, supra note 6, at 36-45.
9. See id. at 136.
10. Id. at 33-36; M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 201
(1957).
11. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. 2, § 17; N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. 7, § IX, 1
N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1929).
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ordaining simple procedures that could be followed by anyone seeking to
incorporate, these laws made the benefits of incorporation generally avail-
able. General incorporation laws thus attempted to guarantee equality of
opportunity by eliminating legislative discretion entirely and offering incor-
poration to those willing to comply with certain statutory requirements
applicable to all corporations formed under their aegis. Some states enacted
such statutes before the Civil War, and the rest followed suit during the
latter part of the nineteenth century.
Free availability of corporate status also addressed the balance of power
concerns by ensuring that more than just a few corporations would dominate
the economic landscape. Nevertheless, the increasing resort to incorporation
for the conduct of ordinary manufacturing, processing, and distribution
functions 2 continued to raise concerns about concentrated, imbalanced
wealth and economic power. Rather than relying solely on market compe-
tition to maintain balance, general incorporation laws therefore imposed
several sorts of restrictions on chartered corporations that were directly
related to these concerns. These restrictions all were designed to control the
creation of economic power, along with its concomitant harmful effects on
workers, consumers, and society as a whole.
Special charters typically had defined the business purposes that a
corporation could pursue and the powers that it could exercise in furtherance
of those goals. Such provisions were intended to ensure that a corporation
would remain within the boundaries contemplated by the legislature. Courts
called upon to construe such provisions generally read them strictly, refusing
to find implied or incidental purposes or powers beyond those specified in
the charter. 3 Even after general incorporation laws became the norm, states
still insisted that corporate charters include specific limitations on corporate
purposes. Some states were willing only to allow incorporation for a single
purpose, 4 and courts continued to construe limitations on corporate pur-
poses and powers strictly.' 5 Although some other states began to allow
incorporation "for any lawful purpose" as early as the 1870s,16 most
corporate charters continued to specify particular purposes long after it was
no longer necessary.' 7 Accordingly, if a charter contained reference to a
12. See generally A. CHANDLER, THE VIsmLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERucAN BustNss (1977).
13. See The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51, 74-75 (1865); Minturn v. Larue,
64 U.S. (23 How.) 435, 436 (1859); Commonwealth v. Central Passenger Railway, 52 Pa. 506,
516-17 (1866).
14. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 131 n.5
(1948).
15. See, e.g., Chewacla Lime Works v. Dismukes Frierson & Co., 87 Ala. 344, 6 So.
122 (1888); Day v. Spiral Springs Buggy Co., 57 Mich. 146, 23 N.W. 628 (1885); Powell v.
Murray, 157 N.Y. 717, 53 N.E. 1130 (1899); People ex rel. Tiffany & Co. v. Campbell, 144
N.Y. 166, 38 N.E. 990 (1894).
16. Act of Feb. 3, 1876, ch. 65, 1876 Me. Laws 51; Act of Apr. 14, 1874, ch. 165, 1874
Mass. Acts 109; Act of June 21, 1875, ch. 611, 2875 N.Y. Laws 755.
17. See H. BALLrN=, P~aVATE CORPORATIONS 198 (1927).
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particular purpose, a general provision authorizing "the transaction of any
lawful business" would be construed to refer only to those matters that
were related to the company's stated purpose.' 8 Thus, the corporate purpose
doctrine served to restrict the range of activity open to a particular firm,
thus constraining its ability to accumulate economic power.
During the nineteenth century, an extensive body of common law
developed in response to the question of what remedies were appropriate if
corporate acts exceeded the purposes and powers conferred in the corporate
charter. The so-called ultra vires doctrine was especially important in cases
in which corporations sought to avoid liability for agreements that exceeded
the corporation's lawful powers. Under the strict view applied by the United
States Supreme Court, any transaction that exceeded the corporation's lawful
powers was void.' 9 State courts, however, tended to distinguish between
partly executed and wholly executory contracts, and held that only the latter
were void. 20 Because an elaborate jurisprudence grew up around these
questions, corporation law treatises addressed them extensively and entire
volumes were devoted to the subject. 2' The great attention this topic once
received reveals the importance of the conviction that corporations should
be strictly limited in their powers to those granted by the state. This concept
persisted despite the solicitude for those who legitimately had relied on a
belief that a corporation was empowered to enter into a transaction that it
later sought to avoid. Not until the 1920s and 1930s did the ultra vires
doctrine lose its significance, as people began to accept a vision of the
corporation as an entity that possessed all of the powers of any natural
person.
22
In addition to the ultra vires doctrine, the desire to impose constraints
on corporate activity also was apparent in the various statutory limitations
on corporate powers that were a typical feature of general incorporation
laws. Of particular importance was the prohibition on ownership of stock
in other corporations. Through this mechanism the states addressed directly
their concerns about consolidation and concentration. As a result, no holding
companies or parent-subsidiary acquisitions were possible, and several states
initiated quo warranto prosecutions against corporations that sought to
evade this prohibition.
23
18. See, e.g., International Lumber Co. v. American Suburbs Co., 119 Minn. 77, 137
N.W. 395 (1912).
19. See, e.g., Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 71 (1879); Pearce v. Madison &
Indianapolis R.R., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 441 (1858). See generally Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra
Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisions, 42 W. VA. L.Q. 179, 297 (1936).
20. See, e.g., Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N.Y. 62 (1875).
21. See S. BRicE, A TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIREs (A. Green 2d ed. 1880);
H. STREET, A TREATISE ON THE DocTRiNE OF ULTRA VIREs (1930).
22. See Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REv. 178, 187-88 (1985).
23. See California v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 7 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 83 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1890); People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 22 N.E. 798 (1887); State v. Nebraska
REBIRTH OF CORPORATION LAW
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, states also imposed dollar
limits on capitalization or on asset value. Such limitations appeared in
special acts and continued to be included in general statutes as well. For
example, Massachusetts, in its first general incorporation act, allowed in-
corporation for "any kind of manufacturing, mechanical, mining or quar-
rying business," but limited capitalization first to $200,000 and later to
$500,000.2 The 1870 Massachusetts statute repealed earlier versions and set
particular limits for various kinds of enterprises. For certain businesses, a
$100,000 limit was in effect until 1903.25 Special acts in New Jersey typically
imposed limits on the amount of real estate that a corporation could own.
26
Even after the general statute of 1846 eliminated such restrictions, 27 they
continued to appear in statutes governing other types of enterprises.
8
Finally, states imposed durational limits on corporate existence. These
limits varied from twenty to fifty years. Nearly half the states still retained
these limitations as late as 1903.29 Once again, the states' goal was to prevent
entrenched concentration of economic power.
As use of the corporate device became increasingly common and general
incorporation laws replaced special chartering as the method for ensuring
equality of opportunity, the states took pains to guarantee that corporations
would not attain enough size or accumulate enough wealth to threaten the
public's interest in a balance of economic power. Thus, corporation law
sought to ensure that corporate purposes and powers were limited, and that
statutory restrictions prevented the creation of large holding companies and
regulated the size and durational existence of corporations. These features
of corporation law were designed to prevent large firms from achieving
arbitrary, uncontrollable power over workers, consumers, and others who
dealt with corporations. Additionally, they responded to concerns that
concentrated economic power might bring with it political power that would
be exercised selfishly. In these ways, the states fashioned a body of cor-
poration law that addressed important social and political concerns resulting
Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N.W. 155 (1890); People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121
N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890); Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S.W. 396
(1888).
24. Act of March 19, 1855, ch. 68, 1855 Mass. Acts 534; Act of May 15, 1851, ch. 133,
1851 Mass. Acts 633.
25. Act of June 17, 1903, ch. 437, 1903 Mass. Acts 418. For other states that retained
dollar limits into the twentieth century, see, e.g., Act of April 26, 1921, No. 84, 1921 Mich.
Pub. Acts 125 (eliminating maximum limit); Act of Mar. 28, 1919, ch. 92, 1919 N.Y. Laws
113 (same); Act of Apr. 1, 1915, No. 141, 1915 Vt. Laws 222 (same).
26. J. CADmAN, THE CORPORATION IN NEw JERS-y: Busaness AND PoLincs 1791-1875
232-34 (1949).
27. Act of February 25, 1846, 1846 N.J. Laws 64.
28. See Act of Apr. 2, 1873, ch. 413, 1873 N.J. Laws 88 (general railroad incorporation
statute); see also Bagby's Code (Maryland), Art. 23, § 245 (limiting land holdings of mining
corporations).
29. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 555 n.29 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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from the special characteristics of business conducted in the corporate form.
B. Protection of Vulnerable Constituencies
In addition to responding to the potentially destructive effects of cor-
porate economic power on the welfare of the general public, corporation
law also included more particular protection for those perceived to be
especially vulnerable in their dealings with corporations.
General incorporation statutes addressed concerns about fraud and
financial irresponsibility. Most notably, state laws actively regulated the
relationship between the corporation and its creditors by denying to share-
holders the full benefits of limited liability. The so-called "trust fund"
doctrine imposed personal liability on shareholders of an insolvent corpo-
ration to the extent they had failed to pay full par value for their stock.30
Statutes also provided safeguards designed to ensure that, if stock was paid
for by property rather than by cash, the corporation received full value
from the shareholder. 3' Most states held shareholders potentially liable even
beyond the value of their investments. The New York general incorporation
law of 1848, for example, imposed "double liability" on shareholders until
all capital was paid in,3 2 and most of the other states followed this model.
33
Additional state constitutional or statutory provisions required even greater
potential liability. 34 In the words of one historian, "the distinction between
the liability of the 'members' of a corporation and a partnership, so clear
to modern eyes, was still regarded rather as a matter of degree than of
kind throughout the nineteenth century." ' 35 All such provisions responded
to the fear that incorporators, operating through the vehicle of a thinly
capitalized shell, might shift the risk of insolvency entirely onto the shoulders
of its creditors. Rather than leaving creditors to protect themselves through
investigation and contract, the states instead took steps to prevent what
they perceived as abuses of the privilege of limited liability.
Not only were shareholders potentially responsible in cases of corporate
insolvency. In addition, the states imposed liability on directors and officers
for various kinds of conduct that could jeopardize creditors' interests. For
example, Massachusetts imposed personal liability for dividend payments
that rendered the corporation insolvent, for debts contracted while loans
were outstanding to shareholders, for permitting debts to exceed capital,
and for allowing stock to be issued in return for overvalued property.
6
30. For the origin of this principle, see Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308 (Mass. 1824);
see also Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873).
31. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 106, 1882 Mass. Acts 78.
32. Act of Feb. 17, 1848, ch. 40, 1848 N.Y. Laws 54.
33. See I W. COOK, TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 203-06 (3d ed. 1894).
34. See 3 S. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIvATE CORPORATIONS chs. 46,
50 (lst ed. 1895).
35. Horwitz, supra note 22, at 208.
36. See Act of March 22, 1882, ch. 106, 1882 Mass. Acts 78.
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This concern for creditors extended not just to banks and other lenders
or to trade creditors. Many states also provided particular protection to
employees, a class of persons deemed particularly vulnerable to financial
manipulation or irresponsibility. For example, a provision of a Pennsylvania
statute qualified shareholder limited liability by excepting claims for "salaries
and wages due and owing to the corporation."
37
Thus, corporation law not only addressed the more general concerns of
workers, consumers, and the public that economic power presented; impor-
tant features of corporation law also offered statutory protection for those
thought to be particularly vulnerable in their dealings with corporations,
primarily corporate creditors and employees. Shareholder property rights
vis-a-vis other constituencies were thus subject to important qualifications,
as the restrictions on limited liability make clear. Thus, as with its more
general concerns about economic power, corporation law again reflected a
vision of the broad purposes that it might serve, a vision that recognized
much more than merely the shareholders' desire to maximize their wealth.
Not until corporations had increased in size and number and individual
participation in the stock market had risen did corporation law begin to
change its focus.3"
II. CORPORATION LAW'S INTERNAL Focus
A. Deregulation
The gradual rejection of the various regulations designed to control
corporate pbwer began during the last years of the nineteenth century, as,
one by one, the states began to "liberalize" their general incorporation
statutes. Because incorporation generated substantial revenue, competition
for corporate charters drove this phenomenon. Initially, states focused their
reforms on the traditional prohibition on corporate ownership of stock in
other corporations, as well as on the limits on size and duration of corporate
existence. Because of recent dramatic increases in the scale of business
enterprises, corporations seeking to expand were eager to escape from these
restraints. The leader of these reforms was New Jersey, which in 1888
became the first state to allow corporations to buy and sell stock, at least
under certain circumstances.3 9 Fearful that New York corporations might
be tempted to reincorporate in New Jersey to take advantage of these
provisions, New York also revised its corporation law in 1890, eliminating
the upper limit on authorized capital and granting limited permission to
corporations to own stock in other corporations. 40 Still fearful of New
37. See Pa. Business Corp. Law § 514; see also Act of March 22, 1882, ch. 106, 1882
Mass Acts 78; N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 71.
38. See Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50
HARv. L. REv. 27, 30-31 (1936).
39. Act of April 4, 1888, ch. 269, 1888 N.J. Laws 385; Act of April 7, 1888, ch. 295,
1888 N.J. Laws 445.
40. Act of June 7, 1890, ch. 567, 1890 N.Y. Laws 1167.
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Jersey's competition, in 1892 New York again revised its statute, expanding
the power to hold stock. 4' New Jersey responded in 1893, declaring expressly
that any New Jersey corporation could buy, hold, and sell stock or bonds
of any other corporation in the same manner as any natural person, and
that corporations could be formed in New Jersey to conduct all their
business elsewhere.4 2 A leading treatise described the aftermath of these
developments in these terms:
New Jersey is a favorite state for incorporations. Her laws seem to
be framed with a special view to attracting incorporation fees and
business fees from her sister states and especially from New York,
across the river. She has largely succeeded in doing so, and now
runs the state government very largely on revenues derived from
New York enterprises. 43
The immediate impact of New Jersey's revisions was the facilitation of
great business combinations. Previously existing trusts or unincorporated
associations now were reorganized as holding companies incorporated in
New Jersey for the purpose of acquiring the stock of firms incorporated
elsewhere. Thus, New Jersey offered a harbor for such enterprises as the
Whiskey Trust, which owned virtually every distillery in the United States
and previously had been attacked by several states, and for the Federal
Steel Corporation, a consolidation of the United States steel and iron
industries that constituted the largest steel company in the world. 4 By 1904,
New Jersey was home to all seven of the largest consolidations, which had
an aggregate caIitalization of over two and a half billion dollars.4 - New
Jersey's receptive attitude thus allowed big business to escape the traditional
constraints on growth and accumulation that other states continued to
impose. An observer of these developments noted that New Jersey had
succeeded in permitting results "regarded by the courts and legislatures of
many states as a serious menace to the social and political welfare of the
people. ' ' 46 Other states soon felt compelled to adopt similar provisions.
New Jersey's thorough revision of 1896 was "the first of the modern
liberal corporation statutes. ' 47 Liberalization of corporation law involved
more than just the removal of obstacles to corporate growth and consoli-
dation. Following New Jersey's lead, other states not only removed barriers
to size and consolidation but also repealed the various regulations that
previously had imposed significant constraints on corporate activity. Thus,
the states abandoned the many regulatory provisions designed to protect
41. Act of Mar. 4, 1882, ch. 188, 1892 N.Y. Laws 422.
42. Act of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 196, 1893 N.J. Laws 301.
43. 2 W. COOK, supra note 33, at 1604.
44. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARv. L. REv. 198, 201 (1899).
45. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 563 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
46. Keasbey, supra note 44, at 202.
47. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J.
663, 664 (1974).
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those who dealt with corporations from those aspects of the corporate form
that were deemed particularly threatening. Various provisions that assigned
liability to directors in cases of insolvency were discarded 8.4 The development
of no-par stock allowed shareholders to escape personal liability for failure
to pay fully for their subscriptions. 49 The personal liability of shareholders
no longer guaranteed employees their unpaid wages.
Competition for corporate charters thus spurred the states to adopt
increasingly lenient incorporation laws. For example, Massachusetts in 1902
established a commission to " 'consider and determine whether the corporation
laws of other states or countries are more favorable than those of this
Commonwealth to the growth of trade, commerce, and manufactures.' "-0
The result was "a vehicle of thoroughly up-to-date model." 5' When, at
Governor Woodrow Wilson's urging, New Jersey reversed course and adopted
a series of statutory revisions unfavorable to big business, Delaware sought to
step into the breach by adopting a new, "liberal" statute designed to attract
out-of-state corporations. 2 Delaware soon succeeded in taking the lead in the
"race to the bottom," which it has not relinquished.
The new vision of the corporation that coincided with the deregulation
movement was "the modern ... theory that, in the absence of fraud in its
organization or government, an ordinary business corporation should be
allowed to do anything that an individual may do." '5 3 Thus, the states no
longer imposed regulations on corporations for the benefit of the general
public or those thought to be particularly vulnerable to corporate activity.
Instead, general incorporation statutes became nothing more than "enabling
acts, ' 5 4 designed to confer maximal freedom on incorporators and manage-
ment "to create whatever arrangements they found most serviceable" to
promotion of business success.55 In Justice Brandeis' famous words, the
deregulation movement of the early decades of this century was a race "not
of diligence but of laxity."
5' 6
B. Reorientation
1. The Internal Balance of Power
As state legislatures competed with each other to free corporations from
the bondage of nineteenth-century regulatory premises, corporation law
48. See, e.g., Mass. Acts & Resolves of 1903, ch. 437, §§ 34, 35. A 1904 amendment
to New Jersey's corporation statute abolished directors' liability to the corporation for dividends
declared out of capital, substituting a less threatening personal right of action for shareholders
injured as a result of such conduct. See Act of March 28, 1904, ch. 143, 1904 N.J. Laws 275;
Fleisher v. West Jersey Securities Co., 84 N.J. Eq. 55, 92 A. 575 (Ch. 1914).
49. See, e.g., Mass. Acts & Resolves of 1920, ch. 349, § 3; N.Y. Laws of 1912, ch. 351.
50. Dodd, supra note 38, at 34.
51. Id. at 37-38.
52. See id. at 43 n.67; Del. Rev. Code ch. 65 (1915).
53. Report of the Committee on Corporation Laws [Massachusetts] 20 (1903).
54. Dodd, supra note 38, at 43.
55. J. HURST, supra note 6, at 70.
56. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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gradually reoriented itself and came increasingly to focus on the corpora-
tion's internal affairs, principally the relationship between management and
shareholders. The balance of power between management and shareholders
was one of the arenas in which states competed for corporate charters.
Because management generally decided where to incorporate, states attracted
corporations by offering corporation law that created a comfortable working
environment for management. Typically this meant that states facilitated
managerial discretion and limited managerial liability. During the early
decades of the nineteenth century, therefore, states redefined the relationship
between management and shareholders in ways that conferred important
new powers on management. Commentators have argued that an important
reason for Delaware's persistent preeminence has been its continuing ability
to create favorable conditions for corporate management vis-a-vis share-
holders.57
As corporations expanded greatly in number and in size and a public
market for industrial securities developed, 5 share ownership became increas-
ingly widespread. The number of Americans that owned stock increased by
a factor of twenty during the first three decades of the twentieth century.5 9
Widely dispersed stock ownership replaced family control and partnership
organization among manufacturing, processing, and distribution firms. 60
Among the larger corporations, majority or even controlling minority stock
holdings became rare.6'
Some important consequences followed from these developments. Share
ownership increasingly lost any sort of meaningful participatory aspect as
shareholders became passive investors who expected others to assume full
responsibility for maximization of the value of their investments. Manage-
ment naturally stepped into this power vacuum. In the words of a leading
treatise,
The enlargement of facilities for the purchase and sale of corporate
securities, the tendency toward combination of corporations, arid
the consequent desirability of diversification of individual invest-
ments have joined to create a class of stockholders who regard
themselves as investors rather than co-entrepreneurs .... Accord-
ingly, modern decisions tend toward an emphasis of the directors'
absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corporations;
57. See Cary, supra note 47. Alternatively, others argue that competition among the
states for corporate charters promotes creation of corporation law that is optimal from the
shareholders' point of view. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). The proliferation of antitakeover laws, with
their attendant adverse impact on shareholders' welfare, see infra part III, is an embarrassment
to adherents of this explanation for the content of state corporation law.
58. See Navin & Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 24
Bus. HIsT. REv. 105 (1955).
59. T. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 163 (1984).
60. See Navin & Sears, supra note 58, at 109-10.
61. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 14, ch. 4.
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the board of directors has achieved a super-control of corporate
management and of the corporation's legal relations.6 2
It was this "separation of ownership and control," and the consequent
accountability problems that it raised, that formed the subject of Berle and
Means' classic work.
63
As the states shifted their attention to the relationship between man-
agement and shareholders, state law gave management important new powers
at the shareholders' expense. For most shareholders, the only realistically
possible influence over the conduct of corporate affairs was through the
election of directors. Yet shareholders lost one potentially important disci-
plinary tool as states eliminated older statutory provisions that allowed
shareholders to remove directors without cause before the expiration of
their terms. 4 Shareholders lost this power under the common law as well. 65
In addition, the general adoption of voting by proxy diluted the significance
of shareholders' voting rights. Under proxy voting, shareholders typically
delegated voting power to management or to some controlling shareholder,
who inevitably voted in 'a self-serving manner. In Berle and Means' words,
"The proxy machinery has thus become one of the principal instruments
not by which a stockholder exercises power over the management of the
enterprise, but by which his power is separated from him."" Similarly,
statutory elimination of traditional unanimity requirements for certain fun-
damental corporate changes such as mergers or sales of substantial assets67
meant that, if management could persuade a majority to agree with its
position, management could force dissenting shareholders to go along.
Perhaps the most fundamental shift in the balance of power between
management and shareholders, however, was the removal of various con-
straints on managerial discretion. As we have seen, special charters as well
as nineteenth-century charters issued pursuant to general incorporation laws
typically included specifically defined corporate purposes and powers. No
departure from these purposes and powers was legal without unanimous
shareholder consent. A primary objective of these restrictions was to grant
to shareholders enforceable expectations as to how management would use
the assets entrusted to it. Because of the move to elaborate all-encompassing
purpose clauses, however, management gained virtually absolute freedom
to make decisions regarding the direction of the firm's business. The only
62. H. SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PniNcnLEs OF LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE
DIREcToRS 4-5 (1931).
63. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 14.
64. Id. at 139.
65. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hutton, 43 Barb. 195 (N.Y. App. Div. 1864); 3 W. COOK,
TREATISE ON COrORaTIONS § 624 (5th ed. 1903):
66. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 14, at 139.
67. For the traditional unanimity rule, see, e.g., Mason v. Pewable Mining Co., 133
U.S. 50 (1890); State ex rel. Brown v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46 (1861); Stevens v. Rutland &
Burlington R.R., 29 Vt. 545 (1851). For its statutory rejection with respect to mergers, see W.
NoYEs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS 36 n.1, 84 n.2 (1902).
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limit on management's discretion was "the imagination of its organizing
attorneys and their ability to embrace the world within the limits of the
English language.''68 Even if the charter did define some specific purpose,
the new statutes allowed charter amendments that were authorized by a less
than unanimous shareholder vote. 69 State statutes also abandoned traditional
restrictions on the board's ability to declare dividends, as well as other
provisions designed to ensure a corporation's solvency. 70 The broad discre-
tion management enjoyed was reconceived as a mandatory statutory norm,
rather than as a result of express or implicit delegation of authority from
the shareholders. 71 As statutes granted management broad discretion in
running the business, courts developed the remarkable doctrinal presumption
that management exercised these powers in good faith.72
While economic conditions and corporation law were redefining the role
of shareholders in the corporation, at a more general level new ideas about
the nature of the corporation also raised important questions about mana-
gerial discretion and accountability to shareholders. Professor Horwitz has
traced the reconceptualization of the corporation as a "natural entity. ' 73
Analyzing doctrinal developments during the early decades of this century
in several areas of corporation law, he argues that the corporation came to
be viewed as a "natural" legal person, as opposed to an "artificial" creation
of the state, and as a distinct "entity," as opposed to a mere aggregation
of individuals that had no separate identity of its own. The new theory
Horwitz identifies justified liberation of the corporation and its managers
from traditional state regulations on the scope of corporate activities and
the extent of corporate economic power. If a corporation was a natural
legal person, no basis existed for imposing restrictions based solely on
corporate status and thus not applicable to other persons. In addition,
because the conceptual separation of the corporate entity from its constituent
shareholders distinguished corporations from partnerships, in which by
definition all owners were entitled to participatory control of the firm, the
separation legitimated release of the new class of professional managers
from shareholder control.
The natural entity theory also had another tendency, however, one that
Horwitz did not recognize. The concept of the corporation as a distinct
entity that enjoyed all of the freedoms enjoyed by other persons could be
used to support the claim that managerial discretion ought to extend to the
68. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 14, at 140.
69. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 17, 1902, ch. 229, 1902 Me. Laws 337; Act of June 17, 1903,
1903 Mass. Laws 437; N.Y. Stock Corporation Law of 1923, §§ 36, 37 (1923).
70. See, e.g., DEL. REV. CODE, ch. 65, § 31, as amended by Act of March 22, 1929,
1929 Del. Laws 366 (allowing dividend payments out of capital).
71. See Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 322, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918) (board's powers
are "original and undelegated").
72. See, e.g., Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A. 257 (Del. Ch. 1929); Robinson v.
Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46 (Del. Ch. 1924).
73. Horwitz, supra note 22.
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use of corporate resources for the benefit of various nonshareholder inter-
ests, even at the expense of shareholders. In a famous article, Professor
Dodd made just this argument. 74 The vision of the corporation that Dodd
advocated was one of the corporation as a citizen engaged in a broad range
of activities and responsive to a broad range of concerns, including the
welfare of its employees, consumers of its products, and members of
communities in which it operates. Applied to natural persons, the concept
of citizenship denotes the individual's willingness to engage in activities that
sacrifice personal financial gain for public benefit. In other words, the
corporation, in addition to maximizing wealth, should enjoy the freedom
to engage in various socially productive activities like any other citizen. The
natural entity theory offered a potential justification for rejecting share-
holders' rights to management's exclusive attention. By suggesting a theo-
retical basis for extremely broad discretion, corporate theory therefore
.presented additional accountability concerns.
2. The Shareholder Primacy Principle
The developments discussed above all shared a common tendency.
Because they raised concerns about the scope of managerial discretion and
about accountability, they all implicated shareholders' financial welfare. In
light of the recent explosion of corporate accumulation (which meant that
large amounts of money were at stake), increasingly broad participation in
the stock market, and big business's growing reliance on the stock market
for capital, this was no small concern. To rein in the potentially troubling
scope of managerial discretion, states formulated a new princi-
ple: management's broad discretion with respect to conduct of corporate
affairs must be exercised solely for the benefit of the shareholders. This
principle therefore offered a benchmark against which to evaluate manage-
ment's conduct, a benchmark which became the fundamental postulate of
corporation law. Only recently has state takeover legislation called this
principle into serious doubt.
During the early decades of this century, the expansion of managerial
discretion was especially troubling to shareholders because no clear doctrinal
principle required management to exercise its powers solely for the benefit
of shareholders. The issue rarely was presented in those terms; instead,
shareholders' complaints about the propriety of managerial conduct typically
were framed as challenges to ultra vires acts. Thus, questions regarding
charitable gifts of corporate funds, political contributions, or expenditures
for the benefit of employees were resolved by reference to the corporate
purposes and powers expressed in the charter, or, less frequently, by
reference to specific statutory prohibitions. The broader question of cor-
porate purpose arose only in cases in which the charter imposed no mean-
ingful restrictions and there was no question of a statutory violation. Unless
74. Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
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a legal rule restricted management to maximizing shareholders' wealth,
management would enjoy the freedom to use corporate resources in ways
that benefitted nonshareholders' interests at the expense of shareholders.
The courts promptly resolved these doubts about the proper objective
of corporate activity and management's role. In a famous case decided in
1919, the Michigan Supreme Court offered the classic statement of the
shareholder primacy principle:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or
to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to
devote them to other purposes. 75
The court cited no precedent in support of this principle. Since then,
however, the Michigan Supreme Court's formulation has been cited countless
times in support of challenges to management conduct that threatens to
subordinate shareholders' financial interests to competing values, such as
concern for workers, the environment, or the community.
76
As corporation law abandoned its nineteenth-century regulatory prem-
ises, firms found themselves in possession of broad legal powers essentially
coextensive with those of natural persons. The absence of externally imposed
limits on corporate power, the widespread separation of ownership and
control, and generous managerial discretion raised new and troubling ac-
countability concerns. The states responded by developing a new body of
law and a new principle, the requirement that management diligently devote
itself to maximizing shareholder wealth rather than other possibly conflicting
objectives. In so doing, corporation law quietly rejected its former concerns
about the dangers that corporate power presented to society and the need
to impose regulations for the benefit of those constituencies most directly
vulnerable to corporate activity.
75. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
76. Since establishment of this basic principle, there have been occasional efforts to
expand the concept of corporate purpose to accommodate conduct that interferes with maxi-
mization of shareholder wealth. The issue has arisen in cases in which shareholders challenge
management policies as inconsistent with maximizing profits. See, e.g., Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d
878 (Del. 1970); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968); Union
Pacific R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958). Courts reject such
challenges if management's conduct can be construed as likely to result in long-run benefits
to the corporation, even if only indirectly. In other cases, shareholders have used various
strategies to attempt to exert pressure on management to pursue political objectives that conflict
with maximizing profits. See, e.g., Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659
(D.C. Cir. 1970); State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406
(1971).
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III. STATE RESPONSES TO HOSTILE TAKEovRs
As hostile takeovers by means of tender offers increased in frequency
during the 1970s, several states enacted statutes to regulate this phenomenon.
In 1982 the United States Supreme Court determined in Edgar v. MITE
Corp."7 that the particular takeover statute at issue was an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce.7 8 A plurality of the Court also concluded
that the statute was preempted by the Williams Act.79 Although MITE
appeared to deal a crippling blow to efforts to regulate takeovers, state
legislatures responded with renewed vigor and continued their efforts to
impose meaningful restraints on the harsh effects of the takeover boom.
The primary impetus for state efforts to regulate takeovers has been
the desire to protect those dependent on the continued presence of corporate
activity from the disruptive effects that hostile takeovers are perceived to
generate. Many believe that the so-called "bust-up" takeover, in which the
successful bidder seeks to liquidate target company assets or otherwise
restructure the company to pay off acquisition indebtedness and realize a
quick profit, has replaced the hostile bid designed to continue operations
under more efficient management. Such transactions are perceived to result
in layoffs or plant closings. Besides causing employees to lose their jobs,
hostile takeovers also threaten established relationships with local suppliers
of goods, services, and credit, and may cause loss of tax revenues and
charitable contributions and other less readily identifiable "ripple effects"
on the communities in which target companies operate. Indeed, it has been
persuasively argued that the source of shareholders' gains in hostile takeovers
depends upon the destruction of established relationships between certain
nonshareholders and the corporation. 0 Even successful efforts to defend
against hostile takeovers often result in significant job losses as a result of
radical corporate restructuring.8 ' By responding to such concerns, takeover
legislation defines as its intended beneficiaries local nonshareholder (or
stakeholder) constituencies rather than typically nonresident shareholders.
To the extent that state legislation succeeds in deterring hostile takeovers,
it is at the shareholders' expense, because the shareholders lose the oppor-
tunity to realize substantial premiums over market price for their shares as
well as the accountability incentives for management that the threat of
hostile takeovers ensures.
In the aftermath of MITE, states seeking to limit takeovers addressed
constitutionality concerns with a new strategy. In place of administrative
review mechanisms and rules designed to supplement the Williams Act's
77. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
78. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982).
79. Id. at 639-40; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
80. SHLIEFER & SUmmERs, BREAcH OF TRUST iN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 2342, 1987).
81. See Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 26 (1987).
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procedural guidelines, several states instead presented takeover legislation in
the guise of traditional regulation of corporate internal affairs. The states
placed these provisions in that quintessentially state-governed body of law,
the general incorporation statute. As such, they could be seen to be examples
of state corporation law's traditional exercise of jurisdiction over such
purely "internal" matters as definition of the attributes of share ownership,
and therefore would be more likely to survive constitutional scrutiny for
that reason.
8 2
One such statute is the control share acquisition statute, which has been
adopted in one form or another by several states.83 Control share acquisition
statutes deny voting rights to successful tender offerors absent approval by
target company shareholders. Rather than directly regulating a bidder's
ability to launch or to consummate a tender offer, these statutes, by
redefining voting rights in this manner, instead impose restrictions on
acquirers' ability to exercise postacquisition control of the acquired com-
pany. Indiana's control share acquisition statute, which survived constitu-
tional attack in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,4 conditions
voting rights on majority approval by all preacquisition disinterested share-
holders, that is, excluding shares owned or controlled by the bidder or by
the target's inside directors or officers. Unless the bidder is willing to wait
for the next shareholders' annual meeting, the necessary plebiscite can be
held at the bidder's expense but only after a delay of up to fifty days.
Moreover, even if the bidder wins the voting rights contest, all dissenting
shareholders have a statutory right to cash out their shares for fair value.
On its face the Indiana statute does not purport to restrict or otherwise
to regulate the frequency with which hostile takeovers occur. Nor does it
say anything about protection of nonshareholders' interests. The United
States Supreme Court in CTS assumed that the statute's purpose was simply
to protect shareholders from coercive two-tier offers, in which a bidder's
willingness to buy only a majority interest forces the remaining target
shareholders to cash out later at a lower price. 85 By assigning to shareholders
the power to decide a bid's fate collectively, the statute neatly addressed
the coercion problem. 86 However, a good deal more was going on beneath
the surface of the Indiana law's apparent policy to protect shareholders.
First, the problem of shareholder coercion, though theoretically compelling,
is simply not very important from a practical standpoint because two-tier
82. For a discussion of this "corporatization" strategy, see Johnson & Millon, Misreading
the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REv .... (June 1989).
83. See generally Note, "May We Have the Last Dance?" States Take Aim at Corporate
Raiders and Crash the Predator's Ball, 45 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 1059 (1988).
84. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
85. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 82-83 (1987).
86. For a discussion of the utility of control share acquisition statutes with respect to
coercive offers, see Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Laws, 86 MICH. L. Rsv. 1635,
1679-99 (1988).
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offers currently are extremely rare and have been so in recent years.8 7 Thus,
one should view the shareholder protection rationale with some skepticism.
Second, as Justice White argued in dissent in CTS, the Indiana statute's
legislative history and the state's brief to the Supreme Court revealed that
the state's real concern was to prevent liquidation or removal out of state
of Indiana corporations.8 8 Third, the statute imposed significant costs on
hostile bidders. The requirement that shareholders approve voting rights
necessarily involves expense and uncertainty. Further, the delay of up to
fifty days, which is itself costly, also gives target company management
opportunities to seek out rival bidders or at least to urge shareholders to
deny voting rights. Finally, the cash-out provision for dissenters also would
raise acquisition costs. For all of these reasons, control share acquisition
statutes-despite their ex post benefits for a target company's shareholders
who actually are confronted with a two-tier bid-surely have an ex ante
deterrence effect on hostile bids for companies under the statutory coverage.
It was evidently this "chilling effect" that led Judge Posner to describe the
Indiana statute as "a lethal dose" for tender offers.8 9 The actual purpose
of the statute thus was not to benefit shareholders of Indiana corporations
but instead to restrict the level of takeover activity and thereby protect
those local constituencies thought to be vulnerable should hostile bids
succeed-a goal that could be achieved only at the shareholders' expense.
Since CTS, commentators generally have recognized that this was the real
purpose and likely effect of the Indiana statute. 90
In upholding the Indiana statute against preemption and commerce
clause challenges, the Supreme Court in CTS avoided any serious analysis
of the true purpose or likely effect of the law. As noted above, the Court
accepted the argument that the statute was intended to neutralize the coercive
effects of two-tier offers; the Court also summarily equated shareholders'
possession of decisionmaking power with a proshareholder purpose. It
therefore slighted the legislation's likely ex ante deterrent effect, seeing
"little evidence" that the statute would harm shareholders by decreasing
the number of successful tender offers. While the Court suggested that
deterrence Would have no effect on its commerce clause analysis, it said
nothing about whether deterrence might be a basis for preemption. Thus,
87. See Mendelsohn & Berg, Anti-Takeover Bill Would Shift Balance of Power, NAT'L
L. J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 38, 40, col. 1.
88. CTS, 481 U.S. at 100-01 (white, J., dissenting).
89. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 262-63 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd
in part, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
90. See, e.g., Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers:
A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HAv. L. REv. 96 (1987);
Steinberg, Federal Preemption of State Antitakeover Statutes: The Time for Congressional
Action is Now, 16 SEc. REG. L.J. 80, 83 (1988); Comment, State Antitakeover Legislation:
Unconstitutional Economic Folly, 20 Auz. ST. L.J. 475 (1988); Coil, Rules are Changing in
Wall Street's Takeover Game, Wash. Post, April 3, 1988, at Hl, col. 1; Miller & Cohen,
Corporate Raiders Predict Hard Times for Hostile Bids, High Court Decision May Have
"Killed" Their Game, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
19881
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:903
the Court has yet to address directly the fundamental question of whether
the Constitution allows the states to use corporation law to limit hostile
takeovers in order to benefit local nonshareholders at the shareholders'
expense.
A more potent form of takeover law presents that question more directly
and therefore probably will require the Court to resolve the issue. Several
states have enacted a different sort of takeover law, termed business
combination statutes. 91 Like the control share acquisition statutes, these
statutes respond to MITE by seeking refuge in state corporation law's
traditional jurisdiction to define the attributes of stock ownership. Business
combination statutes prohibit a successful tender offeror from using its
controlling position to effectuate a merger, sale of assets, liquidation, or
other specified business combination for a period of time, typically three
to five years. These laws generally contain exceptions for cases in which
management is willing to bless the combination. Unlike the control share
acquisition statutes, however, the business combination statutes generally
do not include any provisions allowing shareholders, acting despite man-
agement's opposition, to authorize a business combination and therefore
determine whether a hostile bid contingent on a post-tender offer business
combination will succeed. 92
If there was any doubt about the objective of the control share acqui-
sition statutes, the purpose of the business combination statutes is unmis-
takably clear-to deter hostile takeovers that threaten local nonshareholder
interests. Several statutes expressly identify their intended beneficiaries. For
example, a recent amendment to North Carolina's business combination
statute opens with this preamble:
Whereas, takeovers and takeover attempts of corporations in North
Carolina are occurring with increasing frequency; and
Whereas, such activity can be highly disruptive to communities
within North Carolina by causing, among other things, high un-
employment and erosion of the State and local economy and tax
base; and
Whereas, many of these corporations are not presently subject to
the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act since while substan-
tially present in North Carolina they are chartered elsewhere; and
91. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10,1221 to -1223 (West Supp. 1987); 1988 Conn.
Legis. Serv. P.A. No. 88-350 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-1-43 (Burns Supp. 1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396 to .399 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
351.450 to .459 (Vernon Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:10A-1 to 10A-6 (West Supp.
1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
180.726 (West Supp. 1988).
92. Delaware's statute is exceptional in providing that tender offers resulting in acceptance
by at least 85% of outstanding stock are not subject to the statutory moratorium. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2).
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Whereas, these corporations offer employment to a large number
of North Carolina citizens who pay income taxes, property and
other taxes in this State; and
Whereas, these corporations pay significant amounts of income
taxes to North Carolina; and
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial State and local property
taxes; and
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial sales and use taxes in
North Carolina; and
Whereas, these corporations provide their North Carolina employees
with health, retirement and other benefits; and
Whereas, these corporations and their employees contribute greatly
to community projects in North Carolina; and
Whereas, many unrelated businesses rely on these corporations to
purchase goods and services; and
Whereas, North Carolina has a vital interest in providing to these
corporations the benefits of the provisions of the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act. ... 93
Similarly, Wisconsin's statute declares that Wisconsin corporations "encom-
pass, represent and affect, through their ongoing business operations, a
variety of constituencies including shareholders, employees, customers, sup-
pliers and local communities and their economies," and states further that
it is intended "to promote the welfare of these constituencies" and to
"allow for the stable, long-term growth of resident domestic corporations.
' 94
The legislative history of New York's business combination statute-
which has served as a model for similar laws passed by other states-clearly
reveals the statute's intent to protect nonshareholders. The official memo-
randum that accompanied the bill refers to New York's desire to avoid the
disruptive effects of takeovers on target company employees and on local
communities in which target companies operate. -Thus, the memorandum
anticipates that the new law will encourage commitment to the welfare of
New York corporations and their employees and refers to promotion of
"long-term growth." 95 In other words, the statute will discourage hostile
bidders from taking actions that threaten the continuity of target company
operations. This rationale explains the AFL-CIO's public support for the
measure; a "Support Memorandum" stated that "[n]o matter which side
wins control in a takeover battle, workers, customers, and the community
93. 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 124.
94. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (Vest Supp. 1988).
95. Governor's Program Bill, 1985 Extraordinary Session, Memorandum (C. 915) at 1,
6, 9 (copy on file with author).
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in which the company is located are the likely ultimate losers. '96
Although some business combination laws pay lip service to the rhetoric
of shareholder welfare,97 the policy preference for nonshareholders over
shareholders is clear from the design of all such statutes. These statutes do
not deprive a successful bidder of the power of control as such but instead
impose a lengthy moratorium on the types of transactions that motivate
"bust-up" takeovers. The likely effect of such laws is surely to deter these
bids, because those transactions generally cannot be undertaken unless target
company management consents. A bidder willing to use its control in a
manner that allows existing operations to continue more or less intact,
however, is less likely to be deterred by such a statute. Thus, the statutes'
design strongly implies a desire to protect nonshareholders from disruptive
takeovers.
Additionally, other reasons make it impossible to read the business
combination statutes as laws enacted to protect shareholders. One might
argue that shareholders confronted by two-tier offers face unfair coercion
and therefore need management to intervene. Actually, two-tier bids largely
have disappeared from the takeover scene, 9 and, in any event, because they
apply equally to coercive and noncoercive bids, business combination statutes
are not limited to situations in which management intervention might be
justified on shareholder protection grounds. 99 More generally, by conferring
power to make decisions on management rather than on shareholders, and
by apparently allowing the board broad discretion in the exercise of that
power, it seems safe to assume that at least some hostile bids will fail even
though they might otherwise have attracted a favorable shareholder response.
Again, statutory design belies any persuasive argument that ensuring share-
holders' welfare is the statutory objective.
Perhaps the most significant examples of recent takeover legislation are
the statutes that redefine the board of directors' duty to the corporation
and its shareholders by providing expressly that the board, in exercising its
managerial authority, may take into account the interests of nonshareholders
as well as shareholders. Minnesota's statute expresses this notion most fully:
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may,
in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the
interests of the corporation's employees, customers, suppliers, and
creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and
societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders including the pos-
96. Memorandum dated Dec. 10, 1985 (copy on file with author).
97. North Carolina has titled its antitakeover statute the Shareholder Protection Act.
N.C. GE. STAT. §§ 55-75 (Supp. 1988). Cf. text accompanying supra note 93 (Preamble, in
listing all justifications for statute, does not mention interests of shareholders).
98. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
99. So-called "fair price" and "dissenters' rights" statutes are more appropriately tailored
to the shareholder coercion problem. See generally Note, supra note 83.
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sibility that these interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation. 10
Several other states have passed similar legislation. 0' These provisions,
however, are not restricted to the takeover context. Instead, they redefine
the board's fiduciary obligation in general terms, allowing it to consider
nonshareholders' interests in the discharge of any and all of its various
responsibilities.' °2 Presumably, therefore, management might find refuge in
these laws from shareholder derivative suits alleging, for example, that the
board chose to confer a gratuitous benefit on employees in a manner that
was costly to the corporation. Faced with a hostile takeover bid that
threatens stakeholder relationships, the board under these statutes expressly
may take steps necessary to preserve those relationships, even though
shareholders may lose a profitable tender offer opportunity. Although signs
of common law recognition of such a power do exist,1°3 such express
statutory mandates obviate any need for management to depend upon the
common law. Of course, it remains to be seen what-if any-effect these
changes will have on management's behavior, but their striking departure
from strict shareholder primacy should not be ignored for that reason.
In all of its various forms, recent state takeover legislation represents
a first step toward reshaping corporation law in a manner that will protect
various interests of nonshareholders. Believing that takeover activity threat-
ens these interests, legislators are attempting to address an important feature
of corporate structure, the susceptibility of the corporation to hostile take-
over by means of a tender offer. The redefinition of certain aspects of
share ownership attempts to regulate the incidence of takeovers-at least of
"bust-up" takeovers-to protect those perceived to suffer from their effects.
The new fiduciary duty provisions give the board express power to protect
stakeholders. By seeking to regulate the relationship between the corporation
and various affected constituencies, therefore, the states are rejecting the
purely internal perspective-the focus on management-shareholder rela-
tions-that has characterized corporation law for much of this century. In
effect, we may be witnessing a reemergence of a regulatory conception of
the uses of corporation law.
The effort to make corporation law responsive to the interests of
nonshareholders represents a dramatic departure from the equally venerable
principle that identifies shareholders' welfare as the fundamental postulate
of corporation law. If the control share acquisition and business combination
100. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1988).
101. See AiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para.
8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns Supp. 1988); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1981 & Supp. 1988); Oiuo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (D)
(1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8363 (1988).
102. Arizona's statute thus far contains the only mandatory provision. ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1987).
103. See infra note 116.
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statutes challenge that principle only indirectly, by ex ante deterrence of
hostile bids that promise gains to shareholders, the newly expanded fiduciary
duty laws do so head on. Thus, the states once again are acknowledging
the broad social significance of corporate governance and corporate purpose,
as well as the consequences of corporate activity, and, in the takeover area
at least, are seeking to adjust corporation law accordingly.
Not surprisingly, state legislators have chosen mechanisms different
from those employed by their nineteenth-century forbears for implementa-
tion of their policy objectives. Instead of express prohibitions on certain
troublesome transactions or restrictions on corporate structure, recent an-
titakeover laws operate in one of two ways. First, the control share acqui-
sition and business combination laws seek to decrease the frequency of
takeover activity by redefining the postacquisition powers of the successful
bidder in a manner that will deter hostile bids. Through this method the
states are attempting to package their policy goals as traditional corporation
law, purportedly addressing internal governance concerns through adjust-
ment of the incidents of share ownership. Second, by expressly mandating
consideration of nonshareholder interests, some states have candidly em-
powered the board to resist hostile bids-and other states perhaps impliedly
have done the same by passing business combination statutes and failing to
redefine the duty of care provisions. With this mechanism, the states have
turned to the board's traditional state law responsibility to look after the
welfare of "the corporation and its shareholders."' 104 What is remarkable
in this context, however, is a newly found willingness to consider the
corporation's best interests in terms broader than merely the interests of its
shareholders. While the particular concerns of today are no longer those of
the nineteenth century, and the particular statutory provisions that address
those concerns are different, by using corporation law to protect local
nonshareholders from the consequences of incorporation, recent takeover
legislation resembles the older approach of corporation law that was aban-
doned during the early decades of this century. It is this development that
suggests a rebirth of corporation law.
IV. SoMIE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Although the Supreme Court upheld the Indiana control share acqui-
sition statute in CTS, substantial questions remain regarding the constitu-
tionality of state takeover laws. Because these questions have been discussed
elsewhere, that analysis need not be rehearsed here.1' 5 Instead, the interpre-
tation of the significance of state takeover legislation advanced above-that
104. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503,
510 (Del. Ch. 1939), aff'd, 19 A.2d 721 (Del. 1941).
105. See, e.g., Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second and Third Generations,
23 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 77 (1988); Comment, State Antitakeover Legislation: Unconstitutional
Economic Folly, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 475 (1988); Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation
Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 203 (1987).
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it coincides with an earlier conception of the uses and content of corporation
law-raises some additional questions, to which I now turn.
A. Motivation
Some commentators have questioned .the motivation behind state take-
over laws. They suggest that takeover laws respond to the desires of
management of large, locally resident corporations to protect themselves
from the threat of hostile takeovers, rather than to broader social and
political objectives. According to Professor Romano's recent study, Aetna
Life and Casualty Insurance Company, based in Hartford, Connecticut,
and the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, "essentially a state
chamber of commerce," were the primary proponents of Connecticut's
recent takeover statute. 1' 6 She finds no evidence that other constituencies,
such as as organized labor or community groups, played a role in the
legislative process."07 Nor were shareholders as a class represented. While
conceding that legislators may have been implicitly motivated by concerns
for such constituencies, Romano concludes that the Connecticut statute was
primarily a reaction to pressure from business interests. 0 8 She also suggests
that a similar explanation lies behind recent takeover legislation passed in
other states. ' 9 If she is correct, takeover legislation's apparent focus on
protecting a broad range of constituencies that stand to lose from takeovers
is a sham, a smoke screen that compliant legislatures approved at the behest
of corporate managers seeking to entrench themselves.
Romano's explanation for takeover legislation, however, is unconvinc-
ing. First, in at least some states, including Missouri, New York, and Ohio,
there is explicit evidence of labor's support for takeover legislation, evidence
that Romano acknowledges.' 10 Indeed, in Connecticut itself organized labor
was on record as supporting plant-closing legislation introduced in the
previous legislative session;"' to the extent legislators associated hostile
takeovers with the threat of plant closings, therefore, they may well have
assumed that labor, despite taking no specific position on the takeover bill,
supported such legislation. Second, Professor Romano makes no effort to
explain provisions in other state statutes that refer specifically to a broad
range of nonmanagement interests. Again, Connecticut itself recently has
passed a law that makes clear the legislature's solicitude for nonshare-
holders." 2 Romano offers no reason to doubt that such pronouncements
106. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111, 124
(1987).
107. Id. at 134-35.
108. Id. at 135.
109. Id. at 136-37.
110. Id. at 137-38.
111. Id. at 134 n.58.
112. Connecticut's new law empowers "the Connecticut Partnership Compact," which is
to include representatives of labor and citizen groups as well as business and the legislature,
to impose conditions on certain post-takeover transactions for the benefit of various noninves-
tors. See Connecticut Takeover Statute Barring Raiders Signed Into Law, 20 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 925 (June 17, 1988).
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reflect genuine concerns, regardless of whether active lobbying efforts can
be identified. Groups such as unorganized labor, suppliers of goods and
services, and local communities in which production facilities operate gen-
erally do not engage actively in organized efforts to influence legislation,
or at least they are unable to do so on a systematic basis. Although such
groups therefore may play no visible role in the legislative process, it is a
mistake to assume that legislators are ignorant or unresponsive to their
concerns. Finally, the equation of management's support for takeover
legislation with a management objective of selfishly motivated entrenchment
is questionable. Surely corporate managers are aware that takeovers threaten
their jobs, and they are willing to take steps to defend themselves through
legislative lobbying, charter amendment, or defensive measures after tak-
eovers have been launched. It is incorrect, however, to assume that narrow
self-interest is necessarily management's sole motivation in such situations.
Rather, it seems more accurate to recognize that management often believes
itself responsible for the welfare of a broad range of constituencies that
depend on the continued viability of corporate operations. In other words,
management's participation in the legislative process may signal the vicarious
presence of a broad range of interests that happen to agree with manage-
ment's desire to fend off irresponsible and socially destructive takeover
activity.
Another version of the argument that takeover legislation responds to
the narrow interest of some particular group posits that, in several states,
legislators have reacted hastily to a particular threat to a single company."'
While the resulting legislation in these cases may address the needs of a
broad range of interests associated with the company in question, however,
this argument fails to consider the impact of takeover activity on the broad
spectrum of corporations and constituencies that might be affected. Again,
the legislation is portrayed as the product of concern for some particular
interest rather than as an effort to craft a general solution to a general
problem.
In at least some cases in which this claim has been made, however,
investigation has revealed that the legislation enjoyed the support of a
broadly based coalition." 4 Further, like Romano's thesis, this criticism
oversimplifies the motivations of both the corporate sponsors of the legis-
lation and the legislators themselves. It presumes that the affected corpo-
ration seeks takeover legislation solely for the benefit of those who depend
on that specific corporation, without any regard for other similarly situated
corporations and constituencies that also will benefit from the legislation.
This argument also presumes that legislators rush blindly to do the bidding
of a powerful resident corporation, heedless of the broader public policy
113. See, e.g., Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for
Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 365.
114. See Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 491, 493-500.
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considerations at stake. The impetus for any legislation, however, is often
a particular event involving a limited cast of characters that nevertheless
reveals the need for a broadly applicable legislative response. Such origins
may lead to undue haste and various attendant shortcomings of policy or
drafting, but such origins should not lead one to conclude that the legislation
disserves the public interest for that reason alone. Indeed, the magnitude
of a particular takeover threat may dramatize the extent of a general problem
previously only dimly perceived. Legislators are aware that a statutory
reaction to a particular set of circumstances will have effects well beyond
the situation at hand. It is more sensible, therefore, to presume that such
effects are an important component of the legislative strategy.
Questions about motivation will continue to attend takeover enactments.
Those opposed to such laws no doubt will continue to depict them as mere
entrenchment devices passed solely for the benefit of locally powerful
corporations and those who manage them. Such characterizations deserve
skepticism. To the extent they are accurate, however, they should not be
allowed to obscure the broader issue of the significance of what these laws
represent. Regardless of whether takeover legislation responds to parochial,
short-sighted concerns, its impact is potentially much broader. Moreover,
whatever state legislators have actually been up to, the fact remains that
these laws represent a significant departure from long-standing assumptions
about the proper objectives and beneficiaries of corporation law.
B. Efficacy
In addition to concerns about motivation, some question whether take-
over statutes represent serious efforts to achieve their objective of protecting
nonshareholders. That objective may be clear, but whether the statutes
include effective mechanisms for its realization is not. Most statutes seek
to protect nonshareholders simply by. discouraging certain kinds of hostile
takeovers or takeovers in general. Thus, the control share acquisition statutes
increase the fime necessary to complete a takeover and raise uncertainty
about whether the bidder can exercise fts controlling position once achieved.
Business combination statutes impose a moratorium on transactions that
motivate "bust-up" takeovers. Under either type of statute, however, a
hostile bidder may be able to circumvent statutory obstacles by making a
sufficiently attractive offer to target shareholders. If a control share acqui-
sition statute applies, a bidder may condition its offer on shareholder
approval of its voting rights. Similarly, business combination laws typically
empower management to waive the statutory restriction; management might
be persuaded to do so-indeed might be required to do so by fiduciary
principles-if a bidder offers a high enough price per share. In Delaware,
the prohibition will not apply if the bidder succeeds in obtaining eighty-five
percent of outstanding stock. The effect of control share acquisition and
business combination statutes, therefore, is not to prevent hostile takeovers
entirely. Rather, the states probably will deter at least certain kinds of
takeovers ex ante. As a result, the incidence of hostile bids may decline,
but by some as yet unknown amount.
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Because these statutes will nol necessarily prevent all harmful takeovers,
they will have an unpredictable, hit-or-miss effect. And, in those harmful
takeovers that occur despite statutory obstacles, the bidder's higher costs
will take the form of higher stock premiums and transaction costs. Thus,
target shareholders, investment bankers, and legal counsel will benefit from
the increased costs, but stakeholders and other nonshareholders affected
adversely will not. Accordingly, control share acquisition and business
combination statutes are an imperfect route to the objective of protecting
nonshareholders.
As noted above, some statutes make the relevance of nonshareholders'
interests explicit and attempt to provide a mechanism by which those
interests will be considered. While such laws address nonshareholders'
interests more directly, they too are defective. Control share acquisition
statutes vest shareholders with the ultimate power to decide whether a
particular hostile bid will succeed. Because there is no reason to expect that
shareholders faced with an attractive premium will vote to deny voting
rights because they are concerned about possible loss of jobs or other
effects, provisions instructing the board to consider such matters probably
are ineffective. Even if business combination statutes vest decisionmaking
power in the board and another statute instructs the board to consider
nonshareholders' interests in reacting to a hostile bid, the lack of direction
with respect to evaluation of effects on shareholders and nonshareholders
is a crucial defect. If the interests of shareholders and nonshareholders
conflict, which will be the case whenever an attractive premium is offered
and plant closings or other disruptive events appear likely, the absence of
any guidance as to how various interests of nonshareholders and sharehold-
ers are to be evaluated renders the success of the legislature's objective of
protecting nonshareholders wholly speculative. Especially if consideration
of nonshareholders' interests is merely permissive, it is not possible to
predict whether or how nonshareholders' interests will be valued in particular
cases. Moreover, even if the provision is mandatory, the lack of any clear
guidance remains a basic defect.
Statutes that empower the board to take nonshareholders' interests into
account in responding to hostile takeovers present a further difficulty. Such
a statutory mandate threatens to clash with the board's traditional, common
law fiduciary duty to maximize shareholders' wealth."' If the statute requires
consideration of nonshareholders' interests, as Arizona's statute does, the
legislature has resolved that conflict. In the other states, however, the
statutory mandate is merely permissive. As to these laws, one might argue
that, if a statute permits directors to sacrifice shareholders' welfare in favor
of nonshareholders' concerns, the statute abrogates the common law to that
extent. However, little evidence suggests that the state legislatures have given
any thought to this question. In other words, because the legislators appear
115. This argument is fully developed in Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial
and Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. Coap. L. 35 (1988).
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to have been unaware that they had enacted statutes that conflicted with
preexisting law, one should be reluctant to infer an intent to abrogate basic
common law principles. Under these circumstances, therefore, it is far from
clear which norm-traditional shareholder primacy or the broader protection
of nonshareholders' interests-should guide target company directors con-
fronted with "bust-up" takeovers and the like." 6
The pressures on the board to look after shareholders may well be
irresistible. That is, confronted with a situation in which a statute and
perhaps even common law allow the board to resist a takeover because of
its harmful impact on nonshareholders, the board will be reluctant to resist
on that ground. Ultimately, of course, existing corporation law leaves
management accountable solely to shareholders. To defeat an offer that
would generate high stock premiums certainly would jeopardize manage-
ment's position at the next board election. Furthermore, even if applicability
of the traditional shareholder primacy norm is questionable, the possibility
of liability may well be sufficient to generate a shareholders' derivative
action. In contrast, nonshareholders do not vote for directors and-presum-
ably-lack standing to challenge board actions under recent statutes that
recognize nonshareholders' concerns, just as they lack standing under tra-
ditional corporation law. Doubts about the constitutionality of the statutory
116. Even if takeover statutes do not abrogate the common law principle of shareholder
primacy, there may be another reason why the conflict between statutory and common law is
not as stark as I have presented it. At least in some jurisdictions, inklings exist of a common-
law principle that would allow or even require the board to take nonshareholders' interests
into account in the takeover setting. For example, in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the
Delaware Supreme Court referred to the board's duty to evaluate the threat "to the corporate
enterprise" that a takeover presents. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56
(Del. 1985). Besides considering such factors as adequacy of the tender offer price and other
issues of concern to shareholders, the court stated that the board also may weigh "the impact
on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally)." Id. The court recently noted its adherence to this principle
in another decision, Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42
(Del. 1985), and other jurisdictions follow this approach. See Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l,
741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas law); Course-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634
F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d
357 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New Jersey law); Berman v. Gerber Prods., 454 F. Supp. 1310
(W.D. Mich. 1978) (applying Michigan law).
Yet, what the Unocal principle means in a concrete situation is far from cear. The
Delaware Supreme Court said little about how the board should weigh the respective interests
of shareholders and nonshareholders if they conflict. In a more recent case, the only case in
which the issue actually has been presented, the court determined that the circumstances of
the takeover bid required the board to look solely to the shareholders' interests and subordinate
the competing interests of a class of nonshareholders; once sale of the company appears
inevitable, the board's duty is to auction the company to the highest bidder. Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). This rule, recently reiterated
in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1985), significantly
limits the applicability of the Unocal principle, denying the board any authority to consider
nonshareholders' interests in these auction situations. Because some statutes arguably authorize
defensive measures for the sake of nonshareholders even after Revlon's auction rule, such
statutes conflict with the common law to that extent.
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mandate also may discourage management's reliance on it. If confronted
with a "bust-up" bid, management will take into account the likelihood
that it will lose its position if the bid succeeds. While these concerns might
prompt the board to seek refuge in state law authorizing defensive measures
for the benefit of nonshareholders, "golden parachutes" or other similar
financial incentives often will mitigate concerns about loss of jobs."7 Thus,
although good reasons exist why management might choose not to deploy
defensive powers granted by takeover statutes, few compelling reasons favor
such action. Accordingly, present state efforts to protect nonshareholders
through empowerment of the board of directors may prove to be futile.
Like the question of motivation, doubts about whether takeover laws
will achieve their objectives have no bearing on the significance of these
legislative developments in light of existing assumptions about the purpose
and scope of corporation law. By challenging the shareholder primacy
principle in order to protect nonshareholders, the states depart from ortho-
dox assumptions. This departure parallels nineteenth-century thinking about
corporation law's responsibility to address questions of broad social and
political concern.
CONCLUSION
Corporation law of the later nineteenth century differed in fundamental
ways from the body of law that we are accustomed to today. Most notably,
it sought to regulate particular features of corporate activity that contem-
poraries viewed with distrust. For nineteenth-century Americans, these con-
cerns centered on the perceived ability of corporations to accumulate
threatening economic and political power and the possibility that the priv-
ileges of corporate status might be exercised irresponsibly, to the detriment
of employees and other creditors. No one believed that shareholders' desire
to maximize the value of their investments ought to provide the central
postulate from which the various rules and principles of corporation law
should follow. Recent state statutory developments in the hostile takeover
area parallel this older way of thinking about corporation law. While the
particular policy concerns and statutory solutions are different, the assump-
tions about the scope and purposes of corporation law are similar. Although
there is no reason to believe that the legislators are aware of the implications
of what they are doing, they are-in effect challenging reigning assumptions
about the shareholders' central position in corporation law and policy. Once
again, state legislators are using corporation law to impose restrictions on
corporate activity and are redefining certain attributes of corporate status
in a manner designed to accomplish important social and political objectives.
If courts were to strike down current legislation on constitutional
grounds, they would require state legislators to decide whether to start from
117. A survey published in 1982 concluded that over 60% of the top executives of the
1,000 largest corporations had golden parachutes in place. Loose Ends, FORBES, Nov. 22, 1982,
at 238. Since then that figure no doubt has increased.
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scratch in attempting to protect nonshareholders from the disruptive effects
of hostile takeovers. The extent of state legislators' commitment to those
concerns would be put to the test. Even aside from the question of
constitutionality, should present laws prove ineffective, legislators would
confront the same test. To replace a control share acquisition or business
combination statute with a new form would require careful consideration
of policy questions and a creative approach to formulation of new solutions.
How strong a commitment to nonshareholders would emerge from such
efforts is by no means clear. And whether corporation law-rather than
some regulatory approach external to the corporate statute-would continue
to provide the vehicle for these protectionist goals is also unclear. Accord-
ingly, it remains to be seen whether, if recent developments do represent a
broader view of the purposes and scope of corporation law, the states are
serious about challenging settled assumptions. And, if the challenge is real,
it also remains to be seen whether that challenge will extend beyond the
particular subject of hostile takeovers to other areas of corporation law.
Ultimately, whether we are witnessing a rebirth of a broader conception
of corporation law as a tool for regulating the impact of corporate activity
on society will depend on a deeper question. Competing visions of what
corporations are and who the beneficiaries of corporate activity should be
underlie the debate about the desirability of takeovers and the appropriate
role for state legislation." 8 In effect, the states may be in the process of
reviving an older conception of the corporation as an entity created by the
state for the benefit of the public. That notion legitimates the imposition
of regulations on the relationship between the corporation and society, or
on the relationship between the corporation and certain constituencies whose
welfare is threatened by particular features of corporate activity. The idea
of the corporation as a public institution contrasts sharply with the now
conventional view of the corporation as a private entity entitled-indeed
required-to regard as paramount the welfare of its shareholders, as the
corporation's owners, and no one else.
The states also may be unwitting participants in the creation of a new
theory of what corporations are. Older debates focused on whether the
corporation was an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders or,
instead, merely an aggregation of owners no different from a partnership." 9
The emerging theory also may perceive the corporation as an aggregation
rather than as a separate entity-but an aggregation that includes not only
shareholders but various nonshareholders involved in the corporate enter-
prise. This concept thus legitimates efforts to confer protections on non-
shareholders through corporation law.
As the states continue to wrestle with the difficult questions of law and
policy that takeover legislation engenders, commentators will continue to
118. See generally Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?,
43 WASH. & LE L. Rnv. 781 (1986).
119. See Horwitz, supra note 22.
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criticize departures from pure shareholder primacy. For many, these devel-
opments appear almost heretical-a radical rejection of basic, canonical
ideas about the proper-and necessary-structure of corporation law. Such
critics are correct in seeing these developments as a serious threat to
established assumptions about the basic objectives of corporation law. Yet,
potentially far-reaching and destabilizing as this change in perspective may
be, it is not unprecedented. Whether state legislators know it or not, the
assumptions underlying recent legislation represent the rebirth of an older
tradition that the present shareholder-centered regime itself displaced during
the early decades of this century. Thus, the basic assumptions regarding the
purpose and scope of corporation law that recent takeover legislation appears
to challenge are themselves neither inevitable nor necessary.
